K3's sBOLD vault hit with 10,000 borrowed wstETH and 9 million new BOLD in one transaction
An attacker hit K3 Capital's sBOLD savings vault on Ethereum on Wednesday morning. In one public transaction it borrowed 10,000 wstETH from Morpho, minted 9 million BOLD, cycled it through the vault and then paid ether to the wallet that built the attack contract.
Key points
- At 7:25 a.m. ET on November 18, an Ethereum transaction called a brand-new contract that borrowed 10,000 wstETH from Morpho and 5 WETH from Balancer, Etherscan shows.
- Inside the same transaction, 9,010,000 BOLD (Liquity's dollar token) were minted to the attack contract and 9,000,000 BOLD went into the sBOLD vault, which spread them across three Liquity pools.
- The wallet that deployed the attack contract then received 13 ether payments of about 12 to 13 ETH each from it. We could not confirm the total loss on a source we could open.
What happened
sBOLD is a savings vault built by K3 Capital on top of Liquity V2. Users deposit BOLD, Liquity's dollar token, and the vault spreads it across Liquity's Stability Pools, which earn interest and liquidation gains, Liquity's January 2025 post explains. Each depositor gets sBOLD shares that are meant to track their slice of the vault.
On Wednesday morning that vault was attacked. The main transaction on Etherscan landed in block 26,441,931 at 12:25:47 p.m. UTC (7:25 a.m. ET). It came from wallet 0xDC0e...4dAA and called an unverified contract, 0x19Ad...9634, through a function named run. The same wallet had created that contract, its Etherscan page shows.
Follow the money, step by step
The token transfers Etherscan lists for that one transaction read like a recipe:
- Borrow: 10,000 wstETH (Lido's wrapped staked ether) came in from Morpho, and 5 WETH from the Balancer vault. These are flash loans: money borrowed and repaid inside a single transaction.
- Mint: the 10,000 wstETH went into Liquity's wstETH pool as collateral, and 9,010,000 new BOLD were minted to the attack contract.
- Deposit: 9,000,000 BOLD went into the sBOLD vault, which sent 5.4 million to the wstETH Stability Pool, 2.7 million to the WETH pool and 0.9 million to the rETH pool.
- Cycle: the vault then paid about 9,010,587 BOLD back to the attack contract, slightly more than went in, while sBOLD shares were minted and burned in rounds of about 8.9 million.
The vault's own contract page confirms it is the verified sBold contract. The page lists 231 token transfers in that one transaction alone, so the steps above are the main ones only.
Biggest moves inside the main transaction
tokens (thousands)
Source: Etherscan, transaction 0xa615...2c5c. The 10,000 wstETH flash loan from Morpho is not shown because it is a different token.

Where the ether went
After the main transaction, the attack contract sent ether to the wallet that created it. The wallet's Etherscan page, in the view we opened, listed 13 internal payments from the contract, each between about 12.08 and 13.19 ETH. In that view the wallet held about 111.3 ETH plus 5.86 rETH (Rocket Pool's staked ether), worth about $212,000 together. The contract itself held no ether.
That wallet kept calling the contract many more times after the main transaction. Etherscan showed 72 transactions from it and more calls still pending, so the balances above were still changing. Etherscan showed no public name tag on either address.
What we could not confirm
We could not open any K3 Capital or Liquity post on the incident, so we do not report a loss figure, a pause or any statement from either team. We also could not read the vault's total holdings before and after the attack, which is what a firm loss figure needs.
No post-mortem from K3 Capital was available on any page we could open. A flash loan on its own is not an attack. What matters is that the vault paid out more BOLD than it took in, during one transaction from a contract built by the same wallet that collected the ether. For the user side of crypto theft, see our guide on wallet drainers.
Why it matters for vault users
Vaults like sBOLD sit on top of a base protocol. Even when the base layer works as designed, the vault's own math for pricing shares can be the weak spot. Anyone holding sBOLD should follow only K3 Capital's and Liquity's official channels for updates, and treat any "refund" or "claim" link sent by direct message as a likely scam.
LC Insight analysis
This section is our reading of the facts above, not a statement of fact.
- We think the share price math, not Liquity's core pools, is the most likely weak point, because the main transaction minted and burned sBOLD shares in rounds while the vault paid out more BOLD than it received. Only K3 Capital's post-mortem can confirm that.
- The attack shows how cheap flash loans make large tests of a vault's math. Ten thousand wstETH was borrowed and repaid inside a single transaction, so the attacker needed almost no money of their own.
- The likely next step on-chain is movement of the ether out of the deployer wallet. Its next transfers will show whether the funds head to a mixer, a bridge or an exchange.
What's next
- A K3 Capital post-mortem with the final loss and any plan for depositors
- Any transfer of the roughly 111 ETH out of the deployer wallet
- Whether the sBOLD vault reopens and on what terms
Disclaimer. This article is based on public information and the sources listed below as of the update time shown. It is for information only and is not investment, legal or tax advice. Figures may change as companies and authorities publish new data.
Sources
- Etherscan, transaction 0xa615...2c5c, block 26,441,931 (read November 18 to 19, 2026)
- Etherscan, deployer wallet 0xDC0e...4dAA (read November 19, 2026)
- Etherscan, attack contract 0x19Ad...9634 (read November 19, 2026)
- Etherscan, sBold vault contract 0x50Bd...DD11 (read November 19, 2026)
- Liquity, sBOLD: the on-chain DeFi savings account (January 15, 2025)



